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Appearance and History. The Autographic/Allographic Distinction Revisited
This paper aims at addressing an objection that scholars such as Jerrold Levinson, Flint
Schier, and Gregory Currie have raised against Nelson Goodman’s distinction between
autographic and  allographic  works.1 I will address this objection by drawing on David
Davies’ distinction between e-instances and p-instances of a work.2 I will show that this
way of addressing this objection shed some light on a variety of phenomena related to the
autographic/allographic distinction.
In  §§  1-2  I  will  introduce  the  autographic/allographic  distinction  and  the  e-
instance/p-instance distinction. In § 3 I will use the latter distinction in order to restate the
former in a way that faces the issues raised by its critics.  In §§ 4-5 I will reconsider
Goodman’s distinction between one-stage and  two-stage works as well as his notion of a
notation. In §§ 6-8 I will exploit the restatement of the autographic/allographic distinction
in order to clarify the specificity of two-stage allographic works, the practices of forgery
and plagiarism, and the ontological novelty introduced by digital technologies. In § 9 I
will compare my account of the autographic/allographic distinction with a competitor,
namely  Jason D’Cruz and P.D. Magnus’s account,3 arguing that the former can solve a
problem that afflicts the latter. In § 10 I will draw my conclusions.
1 Jerrold Levinson, ‘Autographic and Allographic Art Revisited’,  Philosophical Studies,  38, 4 (1980),
367–383; Flint Schier, Deeper into Pictures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Gregory
Currie,  An Ontology  of  Art (London:  Macmillan,  1989);  Nelson  Goodman,  Languages  of  Art:  An
Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968). 
2 David Davies, ‛Multiple instances and multiple ‘instances’’,  The British Journal of Aesthetics, 50, 4
(2010), 411–26; ‛Enigmatic variations’, The Monist 95, 4 (2012), 644–63.
3 Jason D’Cruz and P.D. Magnus,  ‛Are  Digital  Images  Allographic?’,  Journal  of  Aesthetics  and Art
Criticism, 72, 4 (2014), 417–27.
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1. The autographic/allographic distinction
Goodman originally  introduces  the  autographic/allographic  distinction  drawing on the
practice  of forgery:  ‛Let us speak of a  work of art  as  autographic  if  and only if  the
distinction between original and forgery is significant; or better, if and only if even the
most  exact  duplication  of  it  does  not  thereby  count  as  genuine.  If  a  work  of  art  is
autographic, we may also call that art autographic. Thus painting is autographic, music
nonautographic, or  allographic’.4 Here, I prefer to rephrase the autographic/allographic
distinction in a way that does not make reference to forgery.  I will come back to the
relation between this distinction and the notion of forgery in § 7 thereby vindicating the
logical connection that Goodman establishes between them. For now, I prefer to draw on
what Goodman writes in a later work: ‛What distinguishes an allographic work is that
identification of an object or event as an instance of the work depends not at all upon how
or when or by whom that object or event was produced’.5 More specifically, I will focus
on this formulation of the autographic/allographic distinction:
(AA1) We are in face of a particular X and we wonder whether X is an instance of a
certain work W. If the connection between the history of production of X and that of W
matters in this respect, then W is an autographic work, otherwise W is an allographic
work. 
As Schier puts it, ‛whether S is the Flagellation by Piero depends upon whether Piero had
4 Goodman, Languages of Art, 113.
5 Nelson Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters (Harvard University Press, 1984), 149.
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a  hand  in  producing  it,  whereas  whether  P  is  a  performance  of  the  Symphonie
Fantastique  depends solely on its conformity to Berlioz’s score. Similarly, whether this
marble object is Bernini’s David turns on Bernini’s role in shaping it, while a book is an
instance of Joyce’s Ulysses so long as it is letter-for-letter identical to the original’.6
Schier criticizes the autographic/allographic distinction contending that ‛aetiology
is  also  important  in  allographic  art.  Whether  P  is  an  instance  of  the  Symphonie
Fantastique  depends on its complying with and originating from Berlioz’s score’.7 In a
similar vein, Levinson argues that all works are autographic since there is ‛no existing art
forms in which historical factors are wholly irrelevant to the question of genuineness of
work  or  instances’.8 Likewise,  Currie  argues  that  ‛Goodman’s  distinction  fails  to
distinguish any kind of art from any other kind’,9 since ‛being a correct instance of a
work of any kind is always partly a matter of history of production’.10
In  particular,  the  autographic/allographic  distinction  seems  incapable  of  dealing
with  works  that  are  perceptually  indiscernible  and yet  distinct.  Schier  points  this  out
drawing on Arthur Danto’s reflections on Jorge Luis Borges’ short story Pierre Menard,
Author of the Quixote: ‛if Menard had succeeded in his mad ambition, his work would
not be Don Quixote by Cervantes, but rather the emanation of a peculiar symbolist poet
of  the  early  twentieth  century.  Similarly,  it  is  logically  possible  that  a  musical
performance which complies with a score of Berlioz’s isn’t a performance of a work by
6 Schier, Deeper into Pictures, 27.
7 Ibid., 28.
8 Levinson, ‘Autographic and Allographic Art Revisited’, 375.
9 Currie, An Ontology of Art, 15.
10 Ibid., 124.
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Berlioz: perhaps it is a performance of a work by a Twin Earth Berlioz’.11
If this is right, all works are autographic since any work has identity conditions that
depend not only on its manifest features but also on its history of production. As Richard
Wollheim points out in his criticism of the autographic/allographic distinction, ‘across the
whole  range of  the arts,  or  for  all  works  of  art,  history of  production is  essential’.12
Remember (AA1): if the connection between the history of production of a particular X
and that of a work W bears upon whether X is an instance of W, then W is autographic,
otherwise  W  is  allographic.  Yet,  the  argument  from  indiscernibility  claims  that  the
connection between the history of production of X and that of W always bears upon X
being an instance of W, and thus the distinction between autographic and allographic
works reveals itself to be unhelpful. It is nothing but the distinction between a predicate
(i.e. autographic) that applies to all works and another (i.e. allographic) that applies to no
work.
I argue that this conclusion is too hasty.  Even if one accepts that any work has
identity conditions that depend on both its manifest features and its history of production,
one is not forced to give up the autographic/allographic distinction. As I will argue in
what follows, Davies’ distinction between e-instances and p-instances gives us a way to
preserve the significance of the autographic/allographic distinction. 
11 Schier,  Deeper  into  Pictures,  28;  Jorge  Luis  Borges,  Pierre  Menard,  Author  of  the  Quixote,  in
Ficciones (New York: Grove, 1962), 45–56; Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace:
A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 34–35.
12 Richard Wollheim, Art and its Objects (second edition revised) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980), 114.
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2. The e-instance/p-instance distinction
Davies shows that the term ‛instance’, when used for works, can be employed in two
different senses, which he calls ‛e-instance’ and ‛p-instance’.13 An e-instance (epistemic
instance) is a particular exhibiting the manifest properties of a work that are relevant for
its  appreciation,  while  a  p-instance  (provenential  instance)  is  a  particular  that  is
appropriately connected to the history of production of that work. Being an  e-instance
depends on what a particular looks like, whereas being a p-instance depends on where a
particular comes from.
Furthermore, in Davies’ account, an e-instance is strict if it exhibits all the relevant
manifest properties of the work, and a p-instance is strict if it is also a strict e-instance.14
Thus all strict p-instances are also strict e-instances, but there may be strict e-instances
that  are  not  p-instances.  I  will  call  the  latter  freestanding  e-instances.  These  exactly
reproduce the appearance of a work even though they are not properly connected to the
history of production of that work. For example,  a strict p-instance of Menard’s  Don
Quixote (henceforth understood according to Schier’s reading) is also a strict e-instance
of Cervantes’s Don Quixote, even though it is not a strict p-instance of the latter. In sum,
a strict p-instances of Menard’s Don Quixote is a freestanding e-instance of Cervantes’s
Don Quixote, that is, an instance that exhibits all the manifest properties of that work that
are relevant for its appreciation, even though it is not properly connected to the history of
production of that work.
13 Davies, ‛Multiple instances and multiple ‘instances’’, 412.
14 Davies, ‛Enigmatic variations’, 647.
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3. Restating the autographic/allographic distinction
The e-instance/p-instance distinction allows us to reformulate the autographic/allographic
distinction in a way that can face the argument from indiscernibility:
(AA2) We are in face of a particular X and we wonder whether X is a strict e-instance of
a certain work W. If the connection between the history of production of X and that of W
matters in this respect, then W is an autographic work, otherwise W is an allographic
work.
In short, autographic works are such that they can have freestanding e-instances. We are
in face of an instance of Menard’s Don Quixote and we wonder whether this is a  strict e-
instance  of  Cervantes’  Don  Quixote.  We  can  safely  give  a  positive  answer  without
committing  ourselves  to  the  controversial  claim  that  Menard’s  Don  Quixote and
Cervantes’ Don Quixote are the same work. In treating these works as allographic we are
just  claiming  that  we  can  use  a  strict  p-instance  of  Menard’s  Don  Quixote as  a
freestanding e-instance of Cervantes’ Don Quixote (or the other way round). 
We can do so provided that we associate the freestanding e-instance with the proper
stock of information concerning the history of production of the relevant work.15 If we
consider  an alleged instance of an allographic  work,  the history of production  of  the
instance  can  be  inappropriate,  provided  that  our  information  about  the  history  of
production of the work is appropriate. That is to say that the information concerning the
history  of  production  of  the  work  can  be  wholly  disentangled  from the  information
concerning the history of production of its instances. 
15 Cf. Davies, ‛Multiple instances and multiple ‘instances’’, 219.
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I do not need to buy a copy of Cervantes’  Don Quixote  and a copy of Menard’s
Don Quixote. I can save money by just buying a copy of Menard’s Don Quixote and then
using it also as an instance of Cervantes’ Don Quixote. I can read two books for the price
of one. This is an advantage provided by allographic works. In order to turn my copy of
Menard’s  Don Quixote into an impeccable instance of Cervantes’  Don Quixote,  I  just
have  to  couple  this  copy  with  the  proper  stock  of  information  about  the  history  of
production of Cervantes’  Don Quixote. I can do so since this stock of information does
not lie in the copy itself, but rather in shared memories and practices (for example, the
entry ‘Cervantes’ in a reliable encyclopedia). 
Autographic works do not allow us to do so. I cannot replace Piero’s Flagellation
or Bernini’s David with some doppelgangers to whom I have associated the proper stock
of information concerning the history of production of Piero’s or Bernini’s masterpieces.
This would not count as a proper appreciation of those masterpieces, whose appearance
cannot be wholly disentangled from their history of production. The appearance carries
some bits of history that no encyclopedia entry could contain. Goodman clearly makes
this point, as we will see by examining his discussion of two-stage autographic works in
what follows. 
4. The one-stage/two-stage distinction
The connection between appearance and history applies not only to what Goodman calls
one-stage autographic works such as paintings or marble sculptures. This applies also to
what  Goodman  calls  two-stage autographic  works such as  cast  sculptures,  art  prints,
photographs or films.
The distinction between one-stage and two-stage works can be figured out in the
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following terms. A one-stage work is such that a beholder can directly appreciate what
has been produced by a maker, whereas a two-stage work requires the mediation of a
process (e.g. screening in cinema, performance in theater) that makes the work accessible
to the beholder. As Goodman puts it: ‛One notable difference between painting and music
is  that  the composer’s  work is  done when he has written the score,  even though the
performances are the end-products, while the painter has to finish the picture. No matter
how many studies or revisions are made in either case, painting is in this sense a one-
stage and music a two-stage art’.16
The  one-stage/two-stage  distinction  is  orthogonal  to  the  autographic/allographic
distinction.  Works of literature and works of theater are both allographic,  and yet  the
former are one-stage whereas the latter are two-stage. Likewise, marble sculptures and
cast sculptures are both autographic, and yet the former are one-stage whereas the latter
are two-stage. 
Two-stage autographic works differ from one-stage autographic works in that they
make room for multiple instances, as far as the process that makes the work accessible to
the beholder is a repeatable process. Nevertheless, such instances can count as strict e-
instances of a certain work only if they are also p-instances of that work. In other words,
two-stage autographic works differs from one-stage autographic works in that they make
room for multiple instances, but not for freestanding e-instances. For what concerns the
latter, two-stage autographic works behave just like one-stage autographic works. 
If you want to properly appreciate a two-stage autographic work you should pay
attention to an instance having the proper causal history, namely a strict p-instance. This
is  the only way at  your  disposal to warrant that  this  instance exhibits  all  its  relevant
16 Goodman, Languages of Art, 113–114.
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manifest  properties.  Autographic  works,  indeed,  are  such  that  their  manifest  features
cannot be disentangled from their history of production. Even if an autographic work is
two-stage and thus can have multiple instances, the latter can be strict e-instances only if
they are properly placed on the causal path that springs from the creation of that work.
Why?  Because,  as  Goodman  puts  it,  autographic  works  are  such  that  ‛minute
discrepancies may always go unnoticed; and there is no basis for ruling out any of them
as inessential. The only way of ascertaining whether a print is genuine is by finding out
whether it was taken from a certain plate’.17
Autographic works are such that we cannot disentangle the totality of their relevant
manifest  features  from their  history  of  production.  We can  do  so  only  if  a  work  is
allographic. In autographic works, the manifest features are drenched with the history of
production.  Therefore,  the  only  way  to  warrant  the  appreciation  of  all  the  relevant
manifest features of a certain autographic work is to pay attention to an instance having
the proper history of production.
5. The role of notation 
What  makes  a  work  allographic?  What  gives  it  the  capacity  to  have  freestanding e-
instances? From Goodman’s  perspective,  there is  a  clear  answer to this  question:  the
availability of a notation, that is, a system of symbols and rules whose ‛primary function’
consists in disentangling the appearance of a work from its history of production.18 I will




More specifically, given an alleged strict e-instance X of W, a notation allows one
to establish whether X really is a strict  e-instance of W regardless of any knowledge
concerning the connection between the history of production of X and that of W. For
example,  the  linguistic  notation  allows  one  to  establish  whether  an  alleged  strict  e-
instance X of Ulysses really is what it alleges to be simply by comparing X with a strict
p-instance of Ulysses.
In the fourth chapter of  Language of Art  (‛The Theory of Notation’),  Goodman
builds  up  a  formal  account  of  notation,  which  rests  upon  syntactic  and  semantic
requirements  (namely,  disjointness,  differentiation,  and non-ambiguity).  Yet,  for  what
concerns the autographic/allographic distinction, which Goodman discusses in the third
chapter of his book (‛Art and Authenticity’), a functional account of notation is sufficient.
We can content ourselves with characterizing a notation as a system of symbols and rules
that fulfills the notational function, that is, the function of allowing us to assess alleged
strict e-instances of a work regardless of any knowledge concerning their connection to
the history of production of that work. From this perspective, Goodman’s  syntactic and
semantic  requirements  for  a  notation  can  be  seen  as  nothing  but  a  formal  way  of
implementing the notational function.
6. The specificity of two-stage allographic works
The capacity of a notation to allow one to  assess alleged strict  e-instances of a work
regardless of history of production is evident in the case of one-stage allographic works
such as poems or novels. Yet, things seem to be more complex in the case of two-stage
allographic works such as musical works, since in this case the alleged strict e-instances
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to be assessed are performances, not mere sequences of symbols to whom the formal
rules constituting the notation can be easily applied. 
In this sense, assessing an alleged strict e-instance of Joyce’s Ulysses is much easier
than assessing an alleged strict e-instance of Mozart’s Jupiter Symphony. The latter task
requires a specific musical competence that allows one to compare the performance with
the score, whereas the former task requires nothing but a comparison of two series of
homogeneous symbols (namely, those constituting the alleged strict e-instance of Ulysses
to be assessed and those constituting the strict p-instance of Ulysses, which plays the role
of yardstick). 
Still,  the  complication  that  characterizes  two-stage  allographic  works  does  not
prevent them from being genuinely allographic. Although assessing an alleged strict e-
instance  of  a  two-stage  allographic  work  requires  a  specific  competence,  such  an
assessment remains independent of knowledge concerning the connection between the
history of production of the alleged strict e-instance and that of the work. In order to
assess whether a performance P counts as a strict e-instance of a musical work W having
S as  its  score,  one  should  just  check whether  the  sequence  of  sounds constituting  P
complies  with  the  sequence  of  symbols  constituting  S.  The  connection  between  the
history of production of P and that of W does not bear upon this assessment. Even though
P has been produced by means of a score S* that is completely unrelated to W, if S* is
notationally identical  to S and P is a correct performance of S*, then P is  a strict  e-
instance of W in spite of lacking the proper historical connection to W. 
In this sense, if one can trust the performers’ capacity to correctly play the score,
the easiest way to assess P as an alleged strict e-instance of W consists in comparing the
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score S* used by the performers with a correct score S of W. Here is a way of bringing
the procedure for assessing instances  of  two-stage  allographic works back to  that  for
assessing instances  of  one-stage  allographic  works.  Comparing  two musical  scores  is
exactly the same kind of procedure as comparing two literary texts. The only difference
lies in the fact that in the case of two-stage allographic works such as symphonies one
should trust the performers whereas in the case of one-stage allographic works such as
novels trust plays no role. 
More generally, a two-stage allographic work involves symbols that are specific to
the performance and therefore different from the symbols involved by the score. In the
case of music, the score involves written notes whereas the performance involves sounds.
In the case of theater, the score involves inscriptions whereas the performance involves
utterances and other actions and events. 
The most straightforward way to check the correctness of a performance (i.e., to
check whether that performance is a strict e-instance of the work) consists in ‘translating’
the performance symbols into the corresponding score symbols (or vice versa), thereby
comparing the translated performance with the original  score.  This operation  requires
some ‘translation competence’ that can be more or less difficult to acquire depending on
both the cultural context and the specificity of the symbols. For example, the translation
competence required by theater (from utterances to inscriptions) seems to be much easier
to acquire than the the translation competence required by music (from sounds to notes) –
at least in the context of our culture, in which literacy is much more widespread than
musical education. 
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However, even when one lacks the relevant translation competence, one can still
assess an alleged strict e-instance of a two-stage allographic work by limiting oneself to
compare the original score with that used by the performers, provided that one trusts the
performers. In sum, trusting the performers is not necessary to assess the correctness of
performances of two-stage allographic works, but it becomes necessary if one lacks the
relevant translation competence.19
7. Forgery and Plagiarism
In the wake of Goodman, the distinction between autographic and allographic works can
be expressed by claiming that only autographic works can be forged.20 Schier developed
this point claiming that while only  autographic  works can be  forged, only  allographic
works can be plagiarized.21
Davies’  distinction  between  e-instances  and  p-instance  allows  us  to  clarify  the
relationship between the autographic/allographic distinction and the practices of forgery
and plagiarism. We can conceive of a  perfect forgery  as a particular  to which a fake
history of production is ascribed with the aim of treating it as a  strict e-instance  of a
certain  work.  In this  sense,  there may be not  only forgeries of one-stage autographic
works  such  as  paintings  but  also  forgeries  of  two-stage  autographic  works  such  as
photographs. A forgery of Piero’s Flagellation is a painting X that pretends to be a strict
p-instance of Flagellation even if Piero did not had a hand in producing X. Likewise, a
19 Thanks to an anonymous referee for leading me to figure out the different roles of competence and trust 
in assessing the correctness of performances of two-stage allographic works.
20 Ibid., 113.
21 Schier, Deeper into Pictures, 29.
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forgery of Robert Capa’s  The Falling Soldier is a photograph X that pretends to be a
strict e-instance of The Falling Soldier even if X is not properly connected to The Falling
Soldier’s history of production. For example, X may be a photograph I took of actors
playing the scene portrayed by The Falling Soldier. 
Still,  it  does  not  make sense to  forge an allographic  work W since in  order  to
ascertain whether a particular X is a strict e-instance of W the history of production is not
relevant. There is no reason why to ascribe a fake history of production to a text X in
order to turn it into a strict e-instance of Joyce’s Ulysses, since the history of production
of X plays no role in X being a strict e-instance of Ulysses.  
Thus, we can characterize perfect plagiarism as the reverse of perfect forgery. The
latter  consists is pretending that a particular X is a strict  e-instance  of a work W even
though, in fact, X is not a strict p-instance of W. Conversely, perfect plagiarism consists
in  pretending that a particular X is not a strict p-instance of a work W even though, in
fact, X is a strict e-instance of W. For example, a perfect plagiarism of Joyce’s Ulysses is
a text that is identical to the text of  Ulysses and yet is pretended to have a history of
production that traces back to an author who is not Joyce.  From this perspective,  the
imaginary Don Quixote written by Menard can be seen as an attempt to turn plagiarism
into a new form of art. 
As it does not make sense to make a perfect forgery of an allographic work, so it
does not make sense to make a perfect plagiarism of an autographic work. In fact, one
cannot plausibly claim that a particular X is not a strict p-instance of an autographic work
W (i.e., X is not properly connected to W’s actual history) even though, in fact, X is a
strict e-instance of W (i.e., X exhibits W’s actual appearance). That is because the only
15
way in which one can show that X is a strict e-instance of W consists in showing that X
is a strict p-instance of W. Of course, I can show you a strict e-instance of The Falling
Soldier saying that I am the true author of this photograph. Yet, if I want to show you that
this really is a strict e-instance of The Falling Soldier, I should reveal its real history of
production, which traces it back to Capa’s creation, and this would inevitably defeat my
claim.
8. The digital extension of the allographic domain 
Restating  the  autographic/allographic  distinction  in  terms  of  the  e-instance/p-instance
distinction allows us to shed some light on the novelty introduced by digital technologies
in the ontology of works such as photographs and films.  In fact,  digital  technologies
introduce  notations  that  move  these  works  from  the  autographic  domain  to  the
allographic one.
As showed above, analog photographs and films are two-stage autographic works.
They can have multiple instances but in order to ascertain whether an instance is a strict
e-instance one should take the history of production into account. For example, the only
way of ascertaining whether a certain screening of  Orson Welles’  film  Citizen Kane  is
genuine is by finding out whether it was taken from a negative that is properly connected
to Orson Welles’ creation.
Still, digital technologies overcome this dependence of assessment of instances on
history of production. For example, digital technologies turn a picture into a digital score
constituted by a series of digital symbols. John Zeimbekis has argued that such a score
does not satisfy all the formal requirements that Goodman imposed on notations.22 Yet,
22 John  Zeimbekis,  ‛Digital  Pictures,  Sampling,  and  Vagueness:  The  Ontology  of  Digital  Pictures’,
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what matters, here, is just that the digital notation fulfills the notational function, which
allows  one  to  assess  an  alleged  strict  e-instance  X  of  a  work  W,  regardless  of  any
knowledge concerning the connection between the history of production of X and that of
W.
Given a digital picture W, one can assess whether an alleged strict e-instance X of
W really is  what it  alleges  to be,  regardless  of any knowledge concerning history of
production. One can do so simply by comparing digital scores. Let us suppose that the
picture W has a digital score S whereas the alleged e-instance X has a digital score S*. A
comparison between S and S* is all we need in order to establish whether X is a strict e-
instance of W. If S is identical with S*, then X is a strict e-instance of W, otherwise it is
not. That is all. The connection between the history of production of W and that of X
plays no role in this assessment.
Thus, a digital picture is a two-stage allographic work just as a musical work like
Mozart’s  Jupiter  Symphony. As seen above,  assessing an alleged e-instance X of  the
Jupiter Symphony, once we have checked or trusted the orchestra’s performance, consists
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 70, 1 (2012), 43–53. Zeimbekis’s argument has been discussed
in the following works: Jason D’Cruz and P.D. Magnus, ‛Are Digital Images Allographic?’; Katherine
Thomson-Jones,  ‛The Philosophy of Digital  Art’,  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (Spring
2015  Edition),  Edward  N.  Zalta  (ed.),  URL  =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/digital-art/>;  John  Zeimbekis,  ‛Why  Digital
Pictures are not Notational Representations’ The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 73, 4 (2015),
449–453; Jason D’Cruz and P.D. Magnus,  ‛Preserving the autographic/allographic distinction’,  The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 73, 4 (2015), 453–457. However, the discussion of Zeimbekis’s
argument  goes  beyond  the  scope  of  my  paper,  except  for  D’Cruz  and  Magnus’s  account  of  the
allographic/autographic distinction, which I will discuss in the next section. 
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in nothing but comparing the musical score of X with the musical score of the  Jupiter
Symphony. Likewise, assessing an alleged e-instance X of a digital picture W, once we
have checked or trusted the displaying mechanism, consists in nothing but comparing the
digital score of X with the digital score of W.
The coming of digital  technologies introduces an ontological  divide in practices
such as photography, cinema and recorded music. An analog photograph, for example, is
a two-stage  autographic  work whose alleged strict e-instances can be assessed only by
considering their  connection to the history of production of the photograph itself.  By
contrast,  a  digital  photograph is a two-stage  allographic  work whose alleged strict  e-
instances can be assessed simply by comparing their digital score to the digital score of
that  photograph,  regardless  on  any  connection  to  the  history  of  production  of  that
photograph. 
It is worth noting that the coming of digital technologies does not automatically
turn  preexisting  analog  photographs  into  allographic  works.  Only  brand-new  digital
photographs are automatically placed into the ontological realm of two-stage allographic
works. 
Indeed, from an ontological point of view, the digitization of analog works is a
quite  complex  matter.  We may use  a  strict  e-instance  of  an  analog photograph,  say,
Robert Capa’s The Falling Soldier, in order to produce a digital copy D of it with the best
technologies at our disposal. Let us call S the digital score that constitutes D. Has this
procedure turned The Falling Soldier into an allographic work? Can we, henceforth, just
assess an alleged strict e-instance X of The Falling Soldier by comparing its digital score
with S regardless of any knowledge concerning the connection between the history of
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making of X and that of The Falling Soldier? The answer to this ontological question has
relevant practical consequences. If we have a way of turning analog works into digital
ones, there seems to be no reasons (at least for what concern the appreciation of these
works) why to spend our energies in the preservation of the original analog templates
(e.g. the negatives of Capa’s The Falling Soldier).
Still, the answer is not obvious. One might argue, in a Goodmanian vein, that the
only strict e-instances of  The Falling Soldier are those analog prints that are in the proper
causal connection to the original negative, since ‛minute discrepancies may always go
unnoticed; and there is no basis for ruling out any of them as inessential’.23 If this is right,
the above mentioned digital copy D does not count as a strict e-instance of The Falling
Soldier, and neither do the other alleged digital strict e-instances whose score is identical
to that of D. At most, D can be treated as the best digital surrogate of The Falling Soldier,
that is,  the best allographic approximation of an irredeemably autographic work. This
seems to be the main reason why the preservation of material templates is still relevant to
the appreciation of works such as photographs, sounds recordings and films that were
originally produced as analog works.
9. A competitor 
In  their  controversy  with  Zeimbekis  on  the  ontology  of  digital  images,  D’Cruz  and
Magnus Cruz provide an account  of  the autographic/allography distinction  which has
some affinities to the one I have proposed in this paper.  But, as I will  show in what
follows, there is also a crucial difference. 
23 Goodman, Languages of Art, 119.
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D’Cruz  and  Magnus  rely  upon  Joseph  Moore’s  distinction  between  a  S-work,
‛which is determined by having a specific structure’, and a P-work,  ‛which is determined
by  having  a  specific  provenance’.24 According  to  Moore,  ‘P-works  supervene  upon
particular actions, including particular psychological and social events’.25 In this sense,
‘we can usefully regard P-works as ‘tradition-threads’—that is, as individual threads in
the broader causal tapestry of musical,  psychological,  and social  events upon which a
musical culture and tradition supervene’.26
D’Cruz  and  Magnus  characterize  the  distinction  between  allography  and
autography in the terms of a distinction between works that exist both as S-works and as
P-works,  and  works  that  only  exist  as  P-works:  ‛We  can  say  that  an  art  form  is
‘allographic’ if works of that form have, as a matter of ontology rather than as a matter of
aesthetics, both a corresponding S-work and a corresponding P-work. If we take this as a
definition, then we should say that a form is ‘autographic’ if and only if works of that
form exist only as P-works’.27 Therefore, music and literature are allographic since their
works exist both as P-works and as S-works, whereas painting and artistic print-making
are autographic since their works only exist as P-works. 
One might  relate  Moore’s  distinction  between  S-works  and P-works  to  Davies’
distinction between e-instance and p-instances. This can be done by conceiving of the S-
work as the formal structure that is instantiated by strict e-instances, and of the P-work as
24 D’Cruz and Magnus, ‛Are Digital Images Allographic?’, 423; Joseph G. Moore, ‛Musical Works: A
Mash-Up’, in Art and Abstract Objects, ed. Christy Mag Uidhir (Oxford University Press, 2013), 284–
306.
25 Moore, ‛Musical Works: A Mash-Up’, 301.
26 Ibid., 302.
27 D’Cruz and Magnus, ‛Are Digital Images Allographic?’, 424.
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the  ‘tradition-thread’  to  whom  p-instances  belong  in  virtue  of  the  proper  causal
connection.  Yet,  it  is  worth  noting  that  Davies’  basically  is  a  pragmatic  distinction
whereas Moore’s is a fully-fledged metaphysical distinction. 
According to Davies, a strict e-instance is a particular that we can  use in order to
properly appreciate the manifest features of a work, without any ontological commitment
on whether that work  exists  both as tradition-thread and  as a formal structure. In this
sense, the fact that a work can have freestanding e-instances only shows that there is a
formal structure whose instances can be used to properly appreciate the manifest features
of that work, but this does not entail that the work exists both as a tradition-thread and as
a  formal  structure.  Davies’  distinction  between  e-instances  and  p-instances  has  no
specific commitment on the metaphysical way in which works exist. 
Instead, Moore’s distinction involves that works such as piano sonatas exist both as
tradition-threads and as formal structures: ‘there are two entities that answer our talk of
one musical work […] It’s surely surprising, then, to learn that when we count the thirty-
two individual  musical  works  that  comprise  Beethoven’s  complete  piano sonatas,  we
traffic in sixty-four distinct entities!’.28
This  difference  has  important  consequences  for  what  concerns  the  criterion  that
specifies the autographic/allographic distinction. Davies’ distinction between e-instances
and  p-instance  leads  one  to  a  Pragmatic  Criterion  (PC),  which  specifies  the
autographic/allographic distinction (AA2) that I have introduced above: 
(PC) Might we use a particular that lacks the proper causal connection to the history of
production of a certain work W in order to properly appreciate the manifest features of
28 Moore, ‛Musical Works: A Mash-Up’, 302-303, my emphasis.
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W? (I.e., might we use such a particular, coupled with the proper information about W’s
history,  in  order  to  properly  appreciate  W?)  If  yes,  W  is  allographic;  if  no,  W  is
autographic. 
Instead, Moore’s distinction between S-works and P-works leads one to a Metaphysical
Criterion (MC), which corresponds to the autographic/allographic distinction proposed by
D’Cruz and Magnus: 
(MC) Does a work W exist both as S-work and as a P-work? If yes, W is allographic; if
no, W is autographic. 
In   many cases,  (PC) and (MC) give  the  same answer  and it  might  me  tempting  to
conclude that they are just two different ways of articulating the same criterion. But one
should resist this temptation, since there is at least one case in which the two criteria can
give different answers. This is the case of digital photographs.29
According  to  (MC),  whether  digital  photographs  are  allographic  like  the  other
digital images or exceptionally autographic depends on the metaphysical conception of
digital  photography  that  one  endorses.  If  one  holds  that  ‘the  digital  photograph  is
essentially  historical’  (since  it  essentially  has  the  modal  property  of  counterfactual
dependence on the subject portrayed) then ‘it exists as a P-work but not as an S-work. It
is therefore, by our criterion,  autographic’.30 Conversely,  if one denies that the digital
photograph is essentially historical, then ‘For a digital photograph, the formal features are
29 Thanks to an anonymous referee for leading me to clarify the difference between the criterion I am 
proposing and that proposed by D’Cruz and Magnus.
30 D’Cruz and Magnus, ‛Are Digital Images Allographic?’, 425.
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fully specified by the pixels. So there is a corresponding S-work, and digital photography
is allographic’.31 
By  contrast,  (PC)  gives  us  an  answer  that  is  independent  of  the  metaphysical
conception  of  digital  photography that  one  endorses.  That  is,  digital  photographs  are
allographic regardless of whether the digital photograph is essentially historical or not.
Even  if  one  endorses  a  metaphysical  conception  of  digital  photography according  to
which  a  digital  photograph  essentially  is  counterfactually  dependent  on  the  subject
portrayed, this photograph remains allographic because we can still use a freestanding e-
instance of it in order to properly appreciate its manifest features (I.e., can we can still
use a  freestanding e-instance,  coupled  with  the  relevant  information  about  history of
production, in order to properly appreciate that photograph). 
It  is  worth  stressing  that,  following  Davies,  I  conceive  of  an  e-instance  as  a
particular  that allows one to  appreciate  the manifest  features  of a work regardless  of
whether this particular is properly connected to the history of production of the work: ‘E-
instances, we saw, are defined in terms of a particular role that they play in appreciation
in virtue of their manifest properties alone’.32 Thus, whether a particular is an e-instance
of a digital photograph or not only depends on how we can use this particular. It does not
depend on whether counterfactual dependency is essential to digital photography or not.
Digital photographs still have freestanding e-instances even if they exist only as P-works.
Certainly, a freestanding e-instance of a digital photograph, unlike a p-instance of it,
is not counterfactually dependent on the subject portrayed.  If something different  had
been in front of the camera, the p-instance would have been be different in turn, whereas
31 Ibid., 425.
32 Davies, ‛Multiple instances and multiple ‘instances’’, 417.
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the  freestanding  e-instance  would  have  remained  the  same.  However,  this  does  not
prevent us, as denizens of the actual world, from  using a freestanding e-instance of a
digital photograph in order to properly appreciate the manifest features of that photograph
– and also in order to fully appreciate that photograph, provided that we have the proper
information  about  its  history  (indeed,  an  information  that  we  also  need  in  order  to
properly appreciate that photograph when faced with a p-instance of it). 
In sum, the lack of counterfactual dependency does not bear upon the possibility of
using a freestanding e-instance in order to properly appreciate a digital photograph, even
if one thinks that counterfactual dependency is essential to digital photography. One can
use a freestanding e-instance in order to properly appreciate a digital photograph and yet
keep insisting that a digital photograph (qua photograph) must carry information about
what was in front of the camera.
This is a theoretical advantage of (PC) in comparison with (MC), since the former,
unlike the latter,  allows us to disentangle the autographic/allographic distinction from
metaphysical controversies on the nature of digital photography. In virtue of (PC), people
can share the same autographic/allographic distinction even though they have different
views on whether counterfactual dependency is essential to digital photography.
Arguably, the case of digital photographs is not the only one that raises such modal
issues.  Consider  a  work  of  history  as  for  example  Thucydides’ History  of  the
Peloponnesian  War.  One might  argue that  this  work counterfactually  depends on the
events  it  portrays  just  as  a  photograph  does.  If  these  events  had  been  different,  the
sequence of words that constitute this work would have been be different in turn. In such
a counterfactual scenario, a p-instance of the  History of the Peloponnesian War  would
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have been be different in turn, whereas a freestanding e-instance would have remained
the same. According to (MC), this would entail that the  History of the Peloponnesian
War is ‘essentially historical’ (in fact, it is a work of history), therefore it exists as a P-
work but not as an S-work, hence it is autographic. 
If this is right, (MC) makes the autographic/allographic distinction vary depending
on metaphysical  preferences  not only in the domain of digital  images  but also in the
domain of literary works. If  one thinks that  counterfactual  dependency is essential  to
works of history just as it is to digital photographs, then one is forced to acknowledge that
in  the  domain  of  literary  works  some  works  (i.e.,  works  of  history)  are  autographic
whereas others are allographic, just as in the domain of digital pictures some works (i.e.,
digital photographs) are autographic whereas others are allographic.
(PC)  effectively  avoids  such  an  awkward  partition  by  focusing  on  the  use  of
particulars as appropriate instances instead of on the metaphysical nature of works. Even
though one thinks that works of history are essentially historical (there seem to be good
reasons to think so), and therefore they only exists as P-works but not as S-works, one
can still  use a  freestanding e-instance  of  the  History  of  the  Peloponnesian  War as  a
substitute  of a strict  p-instance in  order to properly read this  work.  Of course,  if  the
events of the Peloponnesian War had been different, the p-instance would have been be
different in turn, whereas the freestanding e-instance would have remained the same. Yet,
this modal truth does not affect the autographic/allographic distinction, since (PC) allows
us to establish whether a certain work is autographic or allographic regardless of whether
one thinks that modal properties are essential or not to that work (i.e. whether one thinks
that this work can exist only as a P-work or also as a S-work).
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Finally, the dependence of the autographic/allographic distinction on metaphysical
conceptions  of  works  of  art  seems  to  raise  a  problem for  (MC)  also  in  the  case  of
paintings. D’Cruz and Magnus argue that paintings exist only as P-works: ‛there is no
way to elaborate a sense of S-painting’, since ‛there is no separate S-work apart from the
individual object in all its particularity’.33 Yet, one might state that a painting exists both
as a P-work and as a S-work. Wollheim suggests such a conception of paintings when he
writes: ‘in its determinate properties the physical object changes over time, and it is to be
explained by the fact that pigment,  stone, and wood are eminently corruptible:  colour
fades, damp loosens the plaster, the atmosphere erodes the carving. But, by contrast, the
work of art itself  is incorruptible:  its character does not alter with time, and it has no
history […] the aesthetic properties of the physical object change over time whereas those
of the work of art do not’.34
What Wollheim calls ‘the physical object’ corresponds to the P-work whereas what
he calls ‘the work of art’ corresponds to the S-work. From this perspective, our epistemic
difficulties in grasping the S-work that corresponds to a certain painting should not be
confused with the metaphysical fact that this painting does have a separate S-work apart
from the individual object in all its particularity.  In this sense, the practice of painting
restoration might be described as an attempt to bring as much as possible the physical
object, namely the P-work, back to the S-work with which it does no longer comply.
I am not arguing that such a metaphysical conception of paintings is right; I am just
suggesting that is not completely implausible and that one could endorse it. Yet, if one
did so, according to (MC) one would be forced to state that paintings are allographic, and
33 D’Cruz and Magnus, ‛Are Digital Images Allographic?’, 424.
34 Wollheim, Art and its Objects, 121, my emphasis.
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this surely is an awkward consequence. Instead, (PC) avoids this consequence. Even if
one thinks that paintings exist both as S-works and as P-works, one can acknowledge that
we cannot actually use a particular that lacks the proper causal connection to the history
of production of a certain painting in order to properly appreciate the manifest features of
that painting.
Indeed, we could do so only if one day we will discover a notation enabling us to
represent and replicate all the manifest features of a certain painting. For example, one
might  conceive  of  the  ‘super  xeroxing  machine’,  which  has  been  hypothesized  by
Currie,35 as  a  machine  that  exploits  a  (chemical-geometrical)  notation  in  order  to
produces a molecule-for-molecule duplicate of the surface of a certain painting. In this
case, just as (PC) states, paintings would become allographic because one would have the
possibility to  use  a particular that lacks the proper causal connection to the history of
production of a certain painting (but complies with the structure fixed by the notation) in
order to properly appreciate the manifest  features of that painting.36 In this sense, the
super xeroxing machine would turn painting into an allographic art in a way similar to
that  in which digital  technologies  have turned cinema into an allographic  art  (see §8
above). 
10. Conclusion 
Towards the end of the third chapter of  Languages of Art, Goodman hypothesizes that
‛Initially, perhaps, all arts are autographic’,37 but then some of them become allographic
35 Currie, An Ontology of Art, 100. 
36 Cf. Davies, ‛Multiple instances and multiple ‘instances’’, 417.
37 Goodman, Languages of Art, 121.
27
when one has found a way to disentangle the appearance of a work from its history of
production, thereby cutting the umbilical cord that tied this appearance to the individual
who created the work and to the time at which it was created. As Goodman puts is, ‛a
notation may be devised in order to transcend the limitations of time and the individual’.38
Written language allows us to ‛transcend the limitations of time and the individual’
for  what  concerns  literary  works,  and  musical  notation  allows  us  to  do  so  for  what
concerns  musical  works.  Likewise,  the  digital  notation  allows  us  to  ‛transcend  the
limitations  of time and the individual’  for what concerns works such as photographs,
sound recordings and films.
Ultimately,  revisiting the autographic/allographic distinction allows us to rethink
Walter Benjamin’s famous claim that mechanical reproduction deprives works of art of
their  ‛aura’.39 In  a  Goodmanian  reading  of  Benjamin’s,  I  understand the  aura  as  the
connection between the appearance of a work and its history of production.40 In one-stage
autographic forms of art  such as painting or marble sculpture,  the aura is  completely
preserved since the appearance of the work is inextricable from the individual object that
the artist created. In this sense Benjamin compares the individuality of a work of this sort
to that of a person.41
In two-stage autographic arts such as photography and film, there may be multiple
instances of a certain work, and from Benjamin’s perspective this seems enough to claim
38 Ibid., 121.
39 Walter Benjamin, ‛The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility’, in The Work of
Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility and Other Writings on Media ,  Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2008.
40 For a similar interpretation of Benjamin’s notion of aura, see Wollheim, Art and its Objects, 117.
41 Walter Benjamin, ‛The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility’, § IX.
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that works of this sort have lost their aura. Yet, if one applies Goodman’s distinction
between two-stage  autographic works and two-stage allographic  works, one can notice
that, in the spectrum the goes from pure aura to total mechanical reproduction,  analog
photographs and films (as well as analog sound recordings) are not at the end but rather
in the middle. Even though these analog works make room for multiple instances, they
still preserve a connection between the history of production on the instances and that of
the work. As argued above, one can assess an alleged strict e-instance of a two-stage
autographic work only by relating the history of production of this instance to that of the
work.  In  this  sense,  two-stage  autographic  works  still  preserve  some  bits  of  aura,
inasmuch as the assessment of the appearance of their instances cannot be disentangled
from knowledge concerning history of production. 
The end of the spectrum, namely the pure mechanical reproduction, is reached only
by allographic arts, in which the aura, understood as the connection between appearance
and history, no longer plays a role in assessing the appearance of instances. Thus, digital
technologies deprive photographs, sounds recordings and films of those bits of aura that
they still enjoyed in the analog age. From this perspective, what Benjamin calls ‛the loss
of aura’ is the price to pay for having works that can wholly transcend what Goodman
calls ‛the limitations of time and the individual’.
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